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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case involves a group of landlords who object to 
the system of liens used by the City of Philadelphia to collect 
unpaid gas bills. The District Court certified a class and held 
that the City had violated the landlords’ rights under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The City filed 
this appeal, arguing that its procedures for collecting gas debts 
are constitutional. We agree with the City, so we will reverse 
the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
landlords. 
I 
 Before evaluating the City’s various arguments on 
appeal, we begin by describing Pennsylvania’s municipal lien 
system. We then discuss how the City ensures it is paid for gas 
service and the effect its methods have on the Plaintiffs and the 
class of landlords they seek to represent. We conclude these 
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preliminaries with a review of the procedural history of the 
case.  
A 
 Municipal liens in Pennsylvania are created and 
enforced in three steps as set out in the Pennsylvania Municipal 
Claim and Tax Lien Law (the Lien Law), 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 7101–7455. First, a lien is automatically created when a 
municipality acquires a claim against a property, since the Lien 
Law “declare[s]” that all such claims are “to be a lien on said 
property” with “priority to . . . the proceeds of any judicial 
sale.” 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7106(a)(1). Such liens arise by 
operation of law, City of Philadelphia v. Manu, 76 A.3d 601, 
604 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013), and “without any form of 
hearing,” when a municipal claim is “lawfully . . . assessed,” 
Shapiro v. Center Township, 632 A.2d 994, 997 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1993). 
 Second, the municipality perfects the lien by filing it 
with the appropriate local court, 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7143, 
where it is publicly docketed by the Prothonotary, id. 
§ 7106(b). Until filed, a municipal lien may not be enforced 
through a judicial sale of the property. See id. §§ 7185, 7282, 
7283(a). The statute does not require municipalities to provide 
either notice or a hearing before filing a lien. City of 
Philadelphia v. Perfetti, 119 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2015). Municipalities can delay filing a lien indefinitely, id., 
but the lien is not enforceable against subsequent purchasers of 
the property until filed, 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7432, and the failure 
to file a lien within 20 years after the claim accrues deprives 
the lien of priority over other encumbrances, see id. §§ 7183, 
7432. 
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 Third, the Lien Law establishes post-filing procedures 
for judicial sales. A municipality has two options if it wants to 
sell a property to satisfy a gas lien: (1) it can petition the court 
where the lien was filed for a rule requiring interested parties 
to show cause why the property should not be sold, id. 
§ 7283(a), or (2) it may sue on the claim by a writ of scire 
facias, id. § 7185. Scire facias is meant to “warn the owner of 
the existence of a claim so that the owner may make any 
defenses known and show why the property should not be 
under judicial subjection of a municipal lien.” North Coventry 
Township v. Tripodi, 64 A.3d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2013). At the close of a scire facias proceeding, the 
municipality may obtain a judgment in rem and sell the 
property to satisfy it. See 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 7274, 7279, 
7281. 
 Although a municipality may enforce a lien only after it 
is filed, the Lien Law empowers property owners to request a 
hearing on the legality of a lien at any time. There are two ways 
to get a hearing. First, a property owner may discharge the lien 
by paying the amount of the underlying claim into court and 
filing a petition setting out defenses. Id. § 7182. A jury then 
decides whether the municipality or the property owner is 
entitled to the deposited funds. Id.; see also City of 
Philadelphia v. Merz, 28 Pa. Super. 227, 228 (1905) (citation 
omitted). Second, after a claim is filed, a property owner may 
serve the municipality with a notice to issue a writ of scire 
facias. If the municipality does not commence scire facias 
proceedings within fifteen days after receiving the notice, its 
lien is voidable and the property owner may move to strike it. 
53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7184. 
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B 
 The City distributes natural gas to its residents through 
Philadelphia Gas Works (PGW or, for the sake of variety, the 
utility), a public utility owned by the City. As a “city natural 
gas distribution operation,” PGW is “entitled to . . . assess . . . 
and file as liens of record [municipal] claims for unpaid natural 
gas distribution service” under the Lien Law. 66 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 1414(a). 
 The cornerstone of PGW’s lien operations is the “Lien 
Management System” (the System), which relies on computers 
to automatically file real-estate liens. The System scans PGW’s 
billing database for accounts that, according to the utility’s 
criteria, are “lien eligible.” At least seven different criteria—
termed “lien models”—may apply based on whether a property 
is commercial or residential, among other factors. A property 
will become lien eligible when it accumulates a large enough 
arrearage and has been delinquent for a long enough time, with 
“large enough” and “long enough” varying based on which 
model applies. For example, a typical residential account 
becomes lien eligible “once an arrearage reaches $300 and 
more than 91 days have elapsed since the last payment was 
made.” Augustin v. City of Philadelphia, 2017 WL 56211, at 
*3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2017). 
 In theory, once the System identifies an account as lien 
eligible, a pre-filing notification letter is sent to the property 
owner. Pre-filing notices do not contain much information. 
Pennsylvania’s Public Utility Code prohibits PGW from 
disclosing certain confidential information, and the utility 
generally refuses to tell landlords either the identity of the 
tenant whose delinquency led to the lien or when the debt 
accrued. The notices in the record state only the amount of 
 7 
 
money owed and a deadline for payment. Prior to November 
2012, pre-filing notices afforded property owners 11 days to 
pay; today they afford 30 days. If that time passes without full 
payment, the System automatically files the lien with the 
Prothonotary, who dockets it. The System then sends a post-
lien notice alerting the property owner that a lien has in fact 
been recorded. 
 In practice, however, the utility frequently interrupts the 
System’s otherwise-automatic process by making certain 
manual adjustments. These adjustments are grouped into two 
categories—“blockers” and “exceptions.” If the System 
encounters a blocker or an exception, it won’t send notice and 
file a lien on its own. In those cases, notice and filing proceeds 
only if workers manually override the adjustment. 
 PGW’s procedures for addressing accounts that are 
subject to a blocker or exception, but are otherwise lien 
eligible, do not prevent arrearages from continuing to grow. 
Nor do they prevent a delinquent customer from continuing to 
receive service. Rather, they operate only to prevent the lien 
securing the delinquency from being filed with the 
Prothonotary. “Debt often accumulates over many years” as 
delinquent customers continue to use gas. Augustin, 2017 WL 
56211, at *5. And unless they “are specifically authorized . . . 
or are a third-party designee on the account,” landlords are not 
apprised of those growing arrearages. Id.  
 Two blockers that play a significant role in this case are 
“name mismatches” and “address mismatches.” If the 
name/address combination associated with a gas account does 
not match the City’s property tax records, the System will not 
automatically file a lien on the delinquent account. These 
“mismatch liens” often arise when a tenant maintains her own 
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gas-service account. Nevertheless, at the time of the District 
Court’s decision “less than 50% of the mismatch liens on 
record at PGW [were] attributable to a landlord-tenant 
situation.” Id. at *9. Thousands of mismatch liens are filed 
every year, and “it is not uncommon for this blocker to delay 
the pre-lien notices from being sent for years, all while the 
account arrearages continue to grow.” Id at *4. 
 Unsurprisingly, property owners regularly contact 
PGW to ask how they may challenge a lien. When that 
happens, the owner is often told to “file a complaint with the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (“PUC”), . . . [which] 
has repeatedly taken the position that it has no jurisdiction to 
act in matters which arise under the [Lien Law].” Augustin v. 
City of Philadelphia, 171 F. Supp. 3d 404, 414 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
The record shows that the utility knew this and took advantage 
of it by continuing to steer customers in the PUC’s direction in 
spite of the fact that the PUC declined jurisdiction over such 
complaints. Indeed, when two of the named Plaintiffs here filed 
complaints with the PUC, PGW immediately turned around 
and successfully challenged the agency’s jurisdiction. 
C 
 The landlords complain that the City’s lien procedures 
violate their due process rights. There are five named 
plaintiffs—two pairs of residential landlords and one 
commercial landlord. Lea and Gerard Augustin own several 
residential properties in Philadelphia. Between 2009 and 2012, 
PGW repeatedly filed thousands of dollars’ worth of liens 
against the Augustins’ properties on account of tenant 
arrearages dating back as far as 2004. The Augustins first 
learned of the liens in 2011, when the utility sent pre-filing 
notices to their home address. Previous notices had not reached 
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the Augustins because PGW had mailed them to their rental 
properties instead of their residence. In 2012, Lea Augustin 
contacted the utility to seek guidance about the liens and was 
told to file a complaint with the PUC. When the Augustins did 
so, PGW objected to their complaint on the ground that the 
PUC had no power to determine the validity of gas liens. The 
PUC agreed, and dismissed the Augustins’ complaint for lack 
of jurisdiction in May 2013. 
 Donna and Thomas McSorley are also residential 
landlords. In 2013, PGW filed a lien against one of their rental 
properties for about $1,150. Like the Augustins, the McSorleys 
first learned of their tenants’ failure to pay their gas bills when 
they received a pre-filing notice. The McSorleys paid off their 
lien in September 2014. 
 The final named Plaintiff, Richmond Waterfront 
Industrial Park LLC, owns 10 commercial and industrial 
properties in Philadelphia. In 2012, PGW filed two liens 
against one of Richmond’s properties, one for about $3,500, 
and one for more than $27,000. Richmond eventually 
persuaded the utility to identify the delinquent accounts. The 
larger lien secured a delinquency attributable to a tenant that 
had vacated Richmond’s property in 2003. The smaller one 
was attributable to a tenant that had vacated in 2010. Armed 
with that information, Richmond convinced PGW not to file 
the larger lien, but the utility did eventually file the smaller one. 
As in the Augustins’ case, Richmond was told to challenge the 
lien before the PUC. Once again, the PUC declined to act on 
the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over Lien Law disputes. 
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D 
 The five named plaintiffs commenced this action in the 
District Court in mid-July 2014. After discovery closed, the 
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, with the 
landlords’ motion limited to the question of whether the 
utility’s procedures for filing gas liens failed to provide due 
process. The District Court granted summary judgment for the 
landlords, denied the City’s cross-motion, and entered a 
preliminary injunction barring the City from filing new liens or 
collecting on old ones against members of the putative class. 
 With liability decided, the landlords moved for class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and for the entry of final injunctive relief. After a 
two-day hearing, the District Court granted both motions. 
 First, the Court certified a class of 
[a]ll owners of rental properties within the City 
of Philadelphia whose property is or will be 
encumbered by a municipal lien to enforce 
unpaid charges for natural gas service, where 
such service, according to the records of the 
Philadelphia Gas Works, was provided to a 
residential or commercial gas service customer 
other than the property owner, excluding 
however, any owner who was a party in a state 
court scire facias proceeding regarding such lien 
initiated under Article 3 of the Pennsylvania 
Municipal Claims and Tax Lien Act, 53 P.S. 
§ 7182, et seq. if a final judgment in such 
proceeding was entered. 
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App. 57. The named Plaintiffs were appointed class 
representatives, and their lawyers were named class counsel. 
 Second, the District Court entered a final remedial order 
that included both prospective and retroactive elements. The 
District Court enjoined the City and PGW from “filing any 
liens on real property to enforce unpaid charges for natural gas 
service, where such service . . . was provided to a . . . customer 
other than the owner of the property targeted for the lien using 
its current methods and procedures for doing so.” App. 96. The 
order further allowed the City to resume filing liens if it 
provide[d] property owners with (a) meaningful 
notice of the facts underlying the decision to 
impose a lien which is (b) delivered at a 
sufficiently early time as to enable the property 
owner to resolve the problem before the account 
delinquency grows unnecessarily, and (c) 
provide[d] the property owner with an 
administrative opportunity to obtain all relevant 
facts and have all factual disputes resolved 
before the lien is imposed. 
App. 96–97. 
 In addition to the injunction, the District Court ordered 
that “[a]ny existing gas liens currently of record which were 
imposed on properties for unpaid gas charges incurred by a 
class member,” or “Covered Liens,” were “invalid, null, and 
void.” App. 97. It directed the City to vacate all Covered Liens 
and enjoined future attempts to collect them. And it told the 
City to refund all the money it had accepted in satisfaction of 
Covered Liens since the entry of the preliminary injunction. 
The City filed this appeal. 
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II1 
A 
 Before analyzing whether the lien procedures at issue 
here satisfy due process, we must first address the City’s claim 
that it need not provide any process at all.  
 The Due Process Clause applies so long as the City acts 
to deprive the landlords of a “significant”—and therefore 
constitutionally protected—property interest. See Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). The point at which an 
encumbrance on real estate requires due process is controlled 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 
U.S. 1 (1991). In that case, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of Connecticut’s prejudgment attachment 
scheme and held that attachment represents a significant 
deprivation of property, even when the defendant remains in 
possession of the attached assets. The Court reasoned that 
attachment “clouds title; impairs the ability to sell or otherwise 
alienate the property; taints any credit rating; reduces the 
chance of obtaining a home equity loan or additional mortgage; 
and can even place an existing mortgage in technical default 
where there is an insecurity clause.” Id. at 11. 
 Under the Lien Law, similar consequences follow the 
filing—but not the automatic creation—of a lien securing a 
municipal claim. Municipal liens are entitled to priority over 
everything but taxes. 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7106(a)(1). Once 
recorded with the Prothonotary, a gas lien represents a 
significant cloud on the property owner’s title. Indeed, the 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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District Court found that the utility depends on that leverage to 
collect on its liens. Augustin, 2017 WL 56211, at *9. Rather 
than forcing a sheriff’s sale of liened property, the utility’s 
ordinary practice is to “wait[] for properties to either be sold or 
refinanced such that the owner needs to clear title to their real 
estate.” Id. A filed lien, then, interferes sufficiently with 
property interests to trigger scrutiny under the Due Process 
Clause. 
 The same is not true, however, of an unfiled lien, which 
exists only by virtue of its automatic creation under the Lien 
Law. Until perfected by filing, liens are not a matter of public 
record and, by the statute’s express language, will not cloud the 
title held by subsequent purchasers. See 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7432. A lien such as this that does not actually interfere with 
property in any practical sense is not a “significant” 
deprivation for due process purposes. The ultimate question in 
this case, then, is what process must accompany the filing of a 
gas lien. 
 The City resists that conclusion, relying largely on pre-
Doehr federal decisions as authority for the proposition that, so 
long as the owner retains possession and control over her 
property, liens do not work a deprivation sufficient to trigger 
an entitlement to due process. In this Circuit, it was indeed the 
law before Doehr that “[u]nder the [Lien Law] the filing of the 
[lien] does not affect the alleged debtor’s use of the property, 
and no interference with that use can take place until the 
municipality resorts to a judicial foreclosure.” Winpenny v. 
Krotow, 574 F.2d 176, 177 (3d Cir. 1978). That rule, however, 
which has not been relied on by this Court since it was first 
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announced more than 30 years ago, must now give way to the 
Supreme Court’s contrary holding in Doehr.2 
B 
 Having rejected the City’s threshold argument, we turn 
to the landlords’ procedural due process claims, which are 
subject to the familiar standard first announced in Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Whether the City’s lien 
procedures comport with due process depends on the balance 
of three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used” and the value of 
“additional or substitute procedural safeguards” in avoiding 
such errors; and (3) the governmental interest, “including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement[s] 
would entail.” Id. at 335. Because this dispute involves an 
essentially private debt stemming from the City’s participation 
in ordinary commerce, rather than any truly governmental 
action, the final prong of the Mathews test is refocused on “the 
interest of the party seeking the prejudgment remedy,” with 
“due regard for any ancillary interest the government may have 
                                                 
2 The City also cites a recent decision of the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upholding the Lien Law 
against a similar challenge, which relies in part on substantially 
the same obsolete reasoning as Winpenny. See City Br. 30 
(citing City of Philadelphia v. Perfetti, 119 A.3d 396, 405 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2015). 
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in providing the procedure or forgoing the added burden of 
providing greater protections.” Doehr, 501 U.S. at 11.3 
 There is little need for further discussion of the 
landlords’ interest. Although the filing of a lien is “significant” 
enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause, it 
remains a relatively limited interference with the landlords’ 
property. An owner whose property is subject to a lien filed 
under the Lien Law may still use the property or sell it subject 
to the gas debts. Thus, the filing of a lien under the statute 
burdens the right to alienate the subject property, but does not 
abolish it. Indeed, the District Court found that “none of the 
plaintiffs have suffered any injury to their personal credit or 
been impeded or hampered in securing personal loans or re-
financing their personal residences.” Augustin, 2017 WL 
                                                 
3 When States act in commerce as ordinary buyers or 
sellers, the Supreme Court has long recognized at least one 
context in which they are treated like any other market 
participant, with neither particular solicitude granted nor 
special constraints imposed by virtue of their status as 
sovereigns. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–40 
(1980) (discussing the market-participant exception to the 
dormant Commerce Clause). That treatment “reflects a ‘basic 
distinction between States as market participants and States as 
market regulators’” we recognize here as well. See Dep’t of 
Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 339 (2008) (quoting 
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436). But see Edinboro Coll. Park 
Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 567, 582 n.12 
(3d Cir. 2017) (declining to decide whether to recognize a 
similar market-participant exception to state-action immunity 
under the Sherman Act, and observing that the existence of 
such an exception is an open question). 
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56211, at *9. Nor have the liens interfered with the landlords’ 
“ability to maintain their properties or collect rents.” Id. This 
is essentially identical to the deprivation that the Supreme 
Court addressed in Doehr. As such, that case provides a useful 
benchmark for comparison respecting the other factors that 
play into our inquiry under Mathews. 
 The next factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation, is 
somewhat difficult to assess on the present record, which 
comes to us following a summary judgment. As such, the 
District Court was obliged to determine that there was no 
genuine dispute as to the facts on which it based its decision. 
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But the Court largely failed to do so 
with respect to the risk of erroneously-filed liens.  
 The District Court did devote a portion of its order to 
discussing the “Landlord Cooperation Program” (LCP)—a 
voluntary accommodation that the utility reached with a group 
of landlords, under which it refrains from filing liens on 
properties owned by landlords who agree to meet certain 
conditions. Describing problems that PGW had in 
implementing that program, the District Court found as fact 
that “there are frequent errors in the amounts of the liens placed 
[on LCP participants’ properties], which requires [sic] the 
original lien to be manually removed and then replaced by a 
lien for a valid amount.” Augustin, 171 F. Supp. 3d at 413. This 
factual finding was clearly erroneous, however, because the 
witness whose testimony the District Court relied on said no 
such thing. Rather, as the City points out, in response to the 
question, “[D]o you ever have to deal with [errors in lien 
amounts]?”, the testifying PGW employee stated only that 
“[t]here ha[d] been a few, yes,” App. 718 (Tr. 132:20–22). 
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 On appeal, the landlords fare little better in 
demonstrating a major risk of erroneous liens. They assert that, 
“where PGW’s computer system is filing liens with little 
human involvement, there is a substantial risk of liens being 
filed erroneously or in incorrect amounts,” and claim that they 
“presented the district court with a substantial evidentiary 
record concerning the likelihood of mistaken decisions and 
erroneous deprivations.” Landlords Br. 41. Their opening brief 
to this Court, however, points to only one place in the record 
where we can find such evidence—two citations in one 
footnote to the report of the landlords’ expert. And even 
reading that evidence in the most generous light, the risk of 
erroneous deprivation in this case remains significantly less 
than that which existed in Doehr.  
 In that case, Connecticut permitted ex parte attachment, 
before judgment, to secure payment of a potential future 
personal-injury judgment. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 5–6. The 
petitioner attached Doehr’s home “in conjunction with a civil 
action for assault and battery that he was seeking to institute 
against Doehr.” Id. at 5. As the Second Circuit has explained, 
“[i]n Doehr, a substantial risk of error was created by the nature 
of the underlying claim: an intentional tort that had no 
connection to the property and did not ‘readily lend itself to 
accurate ex parte assessment of the merits.’” Diaz v. Paterson, 
547 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Doehr, 501 U.S. at 17) 
(internal alterations omitted). 
 By contrast, disputes about the applicability of a 
municipal lien involve only “determining the existence of a 
debt or delinquent payments”—a matter that lends itself to 
documentary proof and can be calculated with relatively little 
risk of error. Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14–15. The landlords’ expert 
points out that the rules governing gas billing are complicated 
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and sometimes subject to reasonable dispute. And to be sure, 
the calculation of a gas bill is not without risk of error. Cf. Diaz, 
547 F.3d at 98 (prejudgment remedies sought for a promissory 
note for a sum certain and for a mortgage). But although it may 
not always be simple to calculate what is due PGW, the fact 
remains that a claim for gas service already provided is “pre-
existing, readily quantifiable, and largely susceptible to proof 
by documentary evidence.” Id. 
 The risk-of-erroneous-deprivation factor, in addition to 
considering the probability of error, also takes into account the 
consequences of error. More protective process will generally 
be required the more the “length or severity of the deprivation” 
indicate “a likelihood” that “serious loss” will accompany any 
mistake. See Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 
U.S. 1, 19 (1978). Whether a loss is minimal enough to excuse 
the ordinary requirement of pre-deprivation process will 
depend on a variety of factors, including the hardship suffered 
during the deprivation and the adequacy of the available post-
deprivation remedies. 
 By way of example, in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 
(1977), the Supreme Court considered the risk of error 
associated with the decision to suspend a truck driver’s license. 
Id. at 106, 111. In concluding that the risk was relatively low, 
the Court noted that retroactive relief would never be able to 
make a wrongly-suspended driver fully whole because the 
driver would have been irreversibly deprived of time on the 
road. Id. at 113. On the other hand, the Court observed that “a 
driver’s license may not be so vital and essential as are social 
insurance payments on which the recipient may depend for his 
very subsistence.” Id. (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
264 (1970)). In this appeal, both factors point toward a 
relatively low risk. Under most circumstances, an erroneously 
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filed lien can be fully remedied by a post-filing hearing and an 
order removing the encumbrance. And as we noted already, the 
consequences of a mistaken lien are relatively slight—even a 
filed lien does not interfere with the owner’s present use and 
enjoyment of her property. 
 Moreover, the risks that are associated with an 
erroneous lien are mitigated by the post-deprivation remedies 
available under the Lien Law. See Doehr, 501 U.S. at 14–15. 
The most significant risk is that a cloud on title will hinder the 
owner’s ability to dispose of her property exactly as she 
wishes. She may be unable to borrow against it, unable to sell 
it, or be otherwise hindered in various transactions. 
 But as the City points out, an owner who wishes to do 
any of those things despite a lien has two prompt remedies. 
First, she may serve on the City a notice to issue a writ of scire 
facias, in which case the City has only 15 days to respond or 
the lien becomes voidable. Second, an owner may pay security 
into court—immediately clearing the lien—and then proceed, 
clean title in hand, to a full hearing on the validity of the lien. 
Indeed, a property owner could do this before a lien is ever 
filed. See 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7182. And because the utility 
provides 30 days’ notice before a lien is filed, owners have a 
meaningful opportunity to avoid the recording of a lien 
altogether—without prejudicing any defenses they might have. 
 In addition to these statutory remedies, landlords may 
structure their tenant relationships to eliminate the possibility 
of a surprise encumbrance. As the City points out, landlords 
are well-positioned to apprise themselves of their tenants’ 
obligations to PGW, without demanding that the City do so for 
them. They may “(1) contractually require the tenant to prove 
utility payment; (2) contractually require the tenant to allow 
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[the] landlord access to the tenant’s account information; or (3) 
place the bill in the [landlord’s] name by keeping himself as 
customer of record, and incorporate the cost into the rental 
rates.” City Br. 23. Where an individual can protect himself at 
little or no expense, the case for the government’s obligation 
to protect him through a potentially costly and inevitably 
imperfect notice regime is markedly less compelling. 
 The final two factors in our due process inquiry under 
Mathews and Doehr are the interests of PGW as the party 
seeking a prejudgment lien, and of the City as the 
governmental entity responsible for providing any additional 
procedural protections. The utility’s interest is 
straightforward—it has a strong interest in collecting on debts 
legitimately imposed for service already provided. That 
interest in particular, intermingled as it is with the City’s 
interest in stable municipal finances, and the public’s interest 
in a functioning gas-distribution network, weighs heavily in 
our analysis. 
 Moreover, because PGW enjoys an automatic lien on a 
property to which it provides service, it has a preexisting 
interest in the delinquent property at the time a lien is filed. In 
Doehr, the Supreme Court rejected Connecticut’s prejudgment 
attachment scheme in part because it ran in favor of claimants 
who lacked any preexisting interest in the property being 
attached. 501 U.S. at 16. As the Court explained, while the 
presence of such an interest does not mean that no process is 
due, “a heightened plaintiff interest in certain circumstances 
can provide a ground for upholding procedures that are 
otherwise suspect.” Id. at 12 n.4. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence in Doehr sheds additional light on what those 
circumstances might entail: 
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[I]n Spielman-Fond[, Inc. v. Hanson’s, Inc., 417 
U.S. 901 (1974)] . . . Arizona recognized a pre-
existing lien in favor of unpaid mechanics and 
materialmen . . . . Since neither the labor nor the 
material can be reclaimed once it has become a 
part of the realty, this is the only method by 
which workmen . . . may be given a remedy 
against a property owner who has defaulted on 
his promise to pay for the labor and the materials. 
To require any sort of a contested court hearing 
or bond before the notice of lien takes effect 
would largely defeat the purpose of these 
statutes. 
501 U.S. at 28 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 Essentially the same considerations apply here—the 
company can’t take back its gas, so it gets an automatic senior 
lien to secure its deliveries. And since PGW is a regulated 
utility, its ability to select its customers based on 
creditworthiness is greatly restricted. Under these 
circumstances, the recourse that a lien provides to the value of 
the property itself is, as in Spielman-Fond, “the only method” 
for giving PGW a reliable remedy for non-payment. See id. 
 The landlords respond that this case is different than 
other preexisting interest cases “because the debt the City is 
seeking to recover is the debt of someone other than the 
property owner. Pre-deprivation notice is less necessary when 
the person affected already knows of the impending 
deprivation, as is more often the case in a mechanic’s lien or 
lis pendens situation.” Landlords’ Br. 38. We disagree. As the 
City points out, nothing in Doehr or Spielman-Fond suggests 
that the presence or absence of a preexisting interest goes to 
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whether the debtor has prior notice of the debt. Rather, those 
cases rely on preexisting interests only to assess the strength of 
the claimant’s interest in the prejudgment remedy he seeks. 
 Based on the foregoing analysis, we will reverse the 
District Court’s partial summary judgment for the landlords. 
The District Court’s Mathews balancing went astray in three 
ways. First, it failed to recognize the relatively mild imposition 
that filing a municipal lien works on landlords’ property rights. 
Second, it overstated the record as to the risk of erroneously-
filed liens and failed to account for the relative ease of 
accurately calculating gas debts. And finally, it did not take 
proper account of PGW’s preexisting interest in liened 
property. We hold that PGW’s procedures, in combination 
with the remedies made available under the Lien Law, are 
adequate to satisfy due process as applied to the landlords.4 
                                                 
4 Our conclusion accords with those of the Second and 
Tenth Circuits as well as the Rhode Island Supreme Court, 
which have, since Doehr, upheld similar schemes that involved 
encumbering real property to secure a creditors’ preexisting 
interests. See Diaz v. Paterson, 547 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(upholding state lis pendens scheme); Shaumyan v. O’Neill, 
987 F.2d 122, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding the same 
prejudgment attachment statute addressed in Doehr, but as 
applied to a suit between a property owner and contractor); 
Cobb v. Saturn Land Co., Inc., 966 F.2d 1334, 1337–38 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (upholding state mechanic’s lien statute); Gem 
Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 818 (R.I. 
2005) (upholding state mechanic’s lien scheme). 
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* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Court’s 
summary judgment that PGW’s lien procedures violate due 
process, and remand with instructions to enter judgment for the 
City.5
5 The City also asks us to reverse the District Court’s 
class certification order for lack of an adequate class 
representative. We decline to do so because the City failed to 
preserve its argument that Richmond is an inadequate 
representative. Consequently, our decision binds the absent 
class members as well as the named parties. 
